Tuesday, August 11, 2020

I am still alive

I logged in for the first time in years. I am surprised by the sustained traffic this blog is still getting after all those years, and this tempts me to pick up the blogging again. We shall see, but I am not too optimistic. Yes, this has been a long silence. I have been busy with new projects and challenges. I still am, although I have a bit more free time now. It has been interesting, to say the least. I have gone through a long list of comments to moderate. Lots of spam, but some genuine comments, too. I will try to be much more diligent on this, at least.

Wednesday, April 2, 2014

Not dead yet

Sorry for not posting, but I just cannot find the time and will to do so at the moment. And to be frank, I have seen rather little research worth reporting lately. So please be patient. I will restart posting in due time.

Tuesday, March 4, 2014

A long silence

It is now over a month that I have not posted on this blog. Sorry, I am very busy and I have to focus on my day job while juggling with my private life. I'll get back to blogging once I have the time and the energy again.

Friday, January 31, 2014

A debt-free stimulus?

Economies may need to be stimulated sometimes, through tax reductions or public expenditures. The problem is that this costs. Opposition to such stimulus programs is typically grounded on the unavoidable debt run-up, which implies that at some point in the future taxes will need to be raised at a level that is higher than before the stimulus. Would there be a way to pacify this opposition?

According to Laurence Seidman there is. It involves the Federal Reserve, or the corresponding central bank, making a loan to the government treasury for the amount engaged in the stimulus, and then the Fed conveniently forgiving this debt. That is a different way of putting what Seidman proposes: the Fed makes simply a transfer to the Treasury that satisfies the dual mandate of the Fed, full employment and stable prices. Despite what Seidman claims, this is monetizing the debt. Even if no debt is explicitly created, the government is still financing its stimulus by (virtually) printing money, and with the same effect on inflation which guarantees that the dual mandate will not be satisfied for stable prices, and one can have doubts about full employment, too. Seidman argues that there would be no inflation if aggregate demand gets back to the "normal" level with the stimulus. But you still have increased the money supply for the same quantity of goods. The price level needs to increase accordingly. The only way to avoid the inflation is if the Treasury returns the transfer to the Fed. The transfer is thus again a debt.

I find it really strange that a chaired professor at the University of Delaware would write this. The only way I can rationalize his writing is that he confuses real and nominal quantities. He also seems to reason in partial equilibrium, not thinking that prices adjust to such large changes in macroeconomic aggregates, especially in the medium run. We are used to seeing this from crackpots with little economics education, but not with apparently well-educated economists.

Thursday, January 30, 2014

Capitalism's rapture

Economics is based on a small set of very powerful axioms that a the foundation of utility theory, general equilibrium theory, and more. Experiments have contradicted every one of these axioms one way or the other. We still keep them because they seem to apply most of the time, and the occasional violation does not invalidate the general picture. But it is good to keep an eye on their validity and think about alternative scenarios, especially if they bring us better theories.

Egmont Kakarot-Handtke decides to start afresh with a completely new set of axioms. And instead of choosing some that have some subjectivity, he takes some that are as objective as any axiom could be: four accounting identities and definitions. Yes, you read that right. 1) definition of national product (income approach); 2) a linear production function in labor; 3) definition of nominal consumption as the product of real consumption times a price; and 4) the values of all economic variables this year are last year's variables times one plus their respective growth rate plus an independent and random component for each. Easy. From this Kakarot-Handtke builds an elaborate theory that demonstrates with a mathematical proof (it is in the title, so it must be true) that capitalism is on the verge of collapsing. To me it looks more like his readers could collapse from hyperventilating over this amazing pile of rubbish.

This bizarre scientist has trademarked his models. I am afraid I cannot go into more details about this work without violating some law (Trademark law? Law of sanity?). So I leave it at this.

Wednesday, January 29, 2014

The best justification for IS-LM?

IS-LM models have always left me puzzled. To me, they are the equivalent to a reduced-form regression with omitted variables and endogeneity issues. Through a lot of hand-waving, you can have any model fit the data. But what I find the most bizarre is this strange obsession with justifying the IS-LM models from micro-foundations. Somehow, IS-LM is taken as an ultimate truth, and one needs to reverse-engineer it to find what can explain it. The ultimate truth is the data, not the model.

Pascal Michaillat and Emmanuel Saez bring us yet another paper that tries to explain the IS-LM model from some set of micro-foundations. The main ones this time are money-in-the-utility-function and wealth-in-the-utility function (and matching frictions on the labor market, which are not objectionable). I find it very hard to believe that by now anybody would consider this a valid starting point. Rarely does anybody enjoy simply having money, the reason why people like having money is that they can buy things with it, things that are already in the utility function, or that money facilitates transactions, something that you can easily model. The same applies to wealth. True, some people may be obsessed with getting richer just for being rich, but for the remainder of the citizen, they like wealth for what it brings in future consumption for themselves and their heirs, and for the security it brings in the face of future shocks. All this easily modelled in standard models.

It seems to me this paper is a serious step back. Macroeconomists try to understand why there are frictions on markets, so that one better determine the impact of policy on such markets. Simply sweeping everything in the utility function, where in addition one has a lot of freedom in choosing its properties, does not help us in any way. And it is wrong, because it is again some sort of reduced form that is not immune to policy changes. Suppose the economic environment becomes more uncertain. Are we now supposed to say that suddenly households like wealth more? They could also like wealth more because of changes in estate taxation or because of longer lifetimes, and these imply very different policy responses in better flushed-out models.

I just do not get it. Maybe some IS-LM fanboys can enlighten me.

Tuesday, January 28, 2014

Ageing and deflation in Japan

Inflation rates across industrialized economies have been remarkably low in the past decades, and at the same time these economies have been subject to considerable demographic ageing. Nowhere has this been more true than in Japan. What are the government's or the central bank's incentives to set policy that triggers lower inflation if the population gets older? I do not see where monetary policy would matter, but the fiscal theory of inflation may tell us something.

Hideki Konishi and Kozo Ueda study the latter in an overlapping generation model where the fiscal authority has a shorter lifespan than residents, but takes into account the impact of its actions on future governments. The fiscal theory of the price level tells us that inflation goes up when more debt is accumulated, and that is certainly the case when the population gets older and requires more retirement benefits. But the authors point out that this does not necessarily hold once you take into account the endogenous responses of income tax rates and public expenses. Then, because of the policy response it matters why the ageing is happening: lower mortality or lower fertility. Deflation is more likely in the former case. Now we just need someone to bring this to the data...

Monday, January 27, 2014

Tax refunds and myopia

From anecdotal evidence, it appears that many Americans like to use the refund from their yearly tax filing for various home improvement projects. That seems like a strange habit, but could be explained by its timing (Spring season) and the unexpected nature of this windfall that is large enough to allow some major purchase that would not happen during the rest of the year. For perennially cash-constrained households, being forced to put a little aside for a one-time cash-out is the only way to do some capital purchase. Does this theory make any sense? It does in developing countries where ROSCAs are popular for this reason.

It looks like the same holds for US households. Brian Baugh, Itzhak Ben-David and Hoonsuk Park look at purchase patterns when the tax forms are filed and when the tax refund check arrives. The first finding is that consumption does not move at the filing, even though uncertainty about the refund resolves. In other words, a change in the permanent income here does not matter, presumably because there is some constraint. When the refund check is cashed, though, consumption jumps up and returns to the previous levels within weeks. It looks like households are cash-constrained. But the composition of the purchases indicates that there is a substantial amount of non-durables in the basket, showing also they are rather impatient. In fact very little remains for savings. I would have expected that at least credit card debt would be drawn down. One can thus conclude that their myopia dominates the cash constraint. Sad.

Friday, January 24, 2014

Exchange rate commitment always beats capital controls

The recent financial crisis has scared a lot of countries into adopting so called macro-prudential policies that introduce frictions into capital market that can be best summarized as capital controls. The idea is that you want to make sure that market participants are constrained in a way that makes them consider the consequences of their actions onto others. The IMF has encouraged a lot of countries to adopt such policies, in stark contrast to previous stances. And this is backed up by a recent literature that shows these policies are welfare-enhancing.

Gianluca Benigno, Huigang Cheng, Christopher Otrok, Alessandro Rebucci and Eric Young show this is right but suffers from the absence of other policy options. Specifically, once you add a policy to the mix that would be to stabilize the real exchange rate of the local currency in times of crisis, then macro-prudential policies are dominated. I suppose one could then even imagine better policies or policy combinations. But the point is that you need to expand the set of policy options. Why is this exchange rate commitment better? Capital controls act like Pigovian taxation that applies always and leads to a constraint-efficient outcome. A commitment to a real exchange rate applies only at particular times and leads to a conditionally-efficient outcome. That flexibility is key.

Thursday, January 23, 2014

Why firms do not like cutting wages

Nominal wage downward rigidity is a feature of many macro-models that help justify positive optimal inflation rates. In fact, that is pretty much the only way to get a monetary monetary model not to conclude that the Friedman Rule and its deflation is optimal. This rigidity is always assumed on the presumption that somehow employers and employees do not like to reduce nominal wages. Are they subject to a nominal fata morgana or is there more to it? Instead of pontificating from theory and limited data, maybe asking market participants could help.

Philip Du Caju, Theodora Kosma, Martina Lawless, Julian Messina and Tairi Rõõm conducted a survey of firms across 14 European countries. They conclude that issues with unions contracts or collective bargaining were of secondary importance to worker morale and staff retention. This means that including renegotiation costs seems misguided. This does, however, not explain why this is so important to staff morale. After all, what really matters is the real wage. What is this psychological factor that makes us think foremost in nominal terms? Or is it that managers only have the impression that this matters? What we need here is some experimental data where some employees are hit with a nominal wage decrease and others not, and see whether it makes a difference. Good luck finding a manager willing to do that, though. And I wonder whether the surveys results would be different in economies where the social mission of employers is less developed.

Wednesday, January 22, 2014

Taxing banks does not tame them

During the last financial crisis, it was quite obvious that at least some banks were taking excessive risks. What do economists usually advocate when it comes to discouraging particular behaviors? Taxes. And that is popular as the foolishness of banks has imposed costs on the taxpayers. Thus, some countries such as Germany, the UK and the Netherlands have imposed taxes on banks. Did that work?

Not really, tell us Michael Devereux, Niels Johannesen and John Vella. They look back at the experience in various European countries and conclude that while this taxation on borrowed funds indeed reduced borrowed funds, and therefore loans, it turns out that it also increased the riskiness of the funding. These are two bads. First, loans actually encourage the economy. Second the risk has increased is of course counter-productive. Even worse, it is the safest banks that reduced most borrowing the the unsafest ones that took on additional risk. How could this happen? As there were fewer borrowed funds, and hence relatively more own assets, regulations allowed banks to modify their risk-weighted portfolio. In other words, regulation that was invariant to the introduction of the taxes made things worse.

Tuesday, January 21, 2014

Consumption taxation is not that regressive

It is a fact of life that governments need revenue. How to get this revenue without hurting the economy too much has been the topic of much research. Quite obviously, you first want to tax activities that are optimally discouraged, such as smoking and polluting. But that is not sufficient. You do not want to depress the labor supply and thus you want to avoid taking labor income. The alternative is taxing consumption, which you indeed want to discourage in favor of investment, but a consumption tax is deemed regressive and unfair: it hurts proportionally more the poor than the rich.

Nico Pestel and Eric Sommer claim that this perception may only hold in the short-term. Indeed, they find the standard result that a revenue-neutral switching from labor income tax to value-added tax is regressive in the short run. This seems to reverse itself in the longer run, though, thanks to a shift in the labor supply. Using a model estimated on German data, they highlight that the ones responding the most to the reduction in the wage taxation are indeed the poorest, and their response overcomes the progressivity of the income tax. The key here is also reducing payroll taxes which seem to be very discouraging for low income workers.

Monday, January 20, 2014

Uncertain times and price setting

Much has been written, including here, about how policy uncertainty is bad for business. Firms do not want to invest much when it is not clear what lies ahead in terms of fiscal policy, for example. This is particularly bad in countries where such uncertainty is chronic. If fiscal authorities or the government cannot get their act together, maybe the central bank can.

Isaac Baley and Julio Blanco show that if firms face uncertainty, monetary policy has less bite. The reason lies in the endogenous price formation (no Calvo fairy here). Specifically, firms are modeled to forecast their nominal costs, but the learning process is obviously imperfect. As the forecast variance increases, for example due to uncertainty about after tax returns, firms become more sensitive to new information and adjust prices more frequently, paying a menu cost. This effect is stronger than their urge to wait-and-see in the face of uncertainty. All this accelerates the transmission of information about the monetary policy, further dampening its impact. In other words, an ineffective government renders the central bank less effective as well.

Saturday, January 18, 2014

Economic Logic, Too is posting

The companion blog, Economic Logic, Too that was created last December has started posting. This blog features similar posts to Economic Logic, but submitted by guest bloggers. Two posts are up, one is in the works, and I hope more will be coming. If you are reading this through an RSS feed, consider subscribing also to EL2 (RSS). And if you are interesting in posting, shoot me an email (submission rules).

Friday, January 17, 2014

Are NBA coaches behavioral or neoclassical?

Snnk cost do not matter once spent. Yet, we just cannot help thinking that if we already paid so much for something, we should rather use it, even if it is inferior to something less expensive. With this reasoning, we deviate from neoclassical theory into behaviorial theory. Such attitudes are not well documented, and it is not quite evident how one would put together a dataset to study attitudes towards sunk costs.

Daniel Leeds, Michael Leeds and Akira Motomura found a way, and it is in front of everyone. Professional sports teams sometimes invest or commit considerable resources to recruit players, and a substantial amount can be considered sunk, as it is in the form of a signing bonus, guaranteed pay, or by using an early draft pick for new players. A neoclassical theorist would say that this sunk cost only allows the coach to expand his decision set, but who actually plays on the team should only depend on the players' current performance. This study shows that at least NBA coaches do follow this neoclassical thinking and are not more likely to let under-performing young player stay on the team if they were drafted in the early rounds. Indeed, the data focuses on players in the first five NBA seasons when they all have a uniform contract, thus only draft order should matter. However, there could have been a perfectly neoclassical justification for a bias on the part of the coaches: some players were drafter early because they have potential, and that potential is going to develop with playing time. If there is a puzzle it is thus rather why early draftees get so little playing time.