Avoiding the Lewis path

In the best of all worlds, improvements in agriculture productivity leads to surpluses that allow capital accumulation and the development of industry, which then provides better inputs for agriculture. This is a virtuous circles that eventually leads to agriculture using only a tiny fraction of the workforce and representing a minuscule portion of GDP. This so-called Lewis path to growth has happened in many western economies, but does not seem to take off in Africa, in particular.

Bruno Dorin, Jean-Charles Hourcade and Michel Benoit-Cattin show that the Lewis path is not the unique equilibrium path in a growth model. A particular concern is the so-called Lewis trap that would result from a lack of additional agricultural land, where agriculture keeps growing in the labor force for little gain in output. But why insist on farming where land is no good? We have a global economy now and can produce goods where the comparative advantage is highest. Many areas of Africa are simply no good for agriculture, so we should stop insisting that they should go through all the motions of the Lewis path. Go straight to manufacturing and import food (my previous rant on this). This would also imply that other areas would specialize in agriculture, which is good even though the authors complain that this would lead to urban poverty there. People will move where the jobs are, for example to charter cities.

Why invest in cows if their return is negative?

In some developing economies, cattle are used as store of value. This is because there is no other good asset available as financial markets are not developed. Cattle has its drawbacks though, as it can die from disease or hunger, usually at the worst moment, can walk away or be stolen, and thus needs constant guard. This implies that their return could actually be negative.

Santosh Anagol, Alvin Etang and Dean Karlan find that cows and buffaloes in rural India have a negative return of a whooping 64% respectively 39%. If you take the extreme assumption that labor has no return, then their returns are minus 6% respectively plus 13%. How is that possible? The authors offer several potential explanations: measurement error, preference for home-made milk, the lack of other saving vehicles, in particular those that allow commitment to keeping those savings, improvement in social and religious standing, and preference for lotteries (small probability of striking it rich with female cattle). The one I like the most is that marginal return of labor is actually zero. Indeed, farms do not operate like firms. As they are typically family-operated, everyone "works" even if that means being idle most of the day. This idle person may have a productivity close to zero, and may thus be used to guard cattle.

There is demand for fresh fruit in Scotland!

When I am thinking about Scotland and the average diet of its residents, I am not thinking about fresh fruit. Indeed, obesity rates there are about the highest anywhere in the world, thanks to a combination of greasy food, high alcohol consumption and general lack of exercise. Fresh fruit does not seem to be high in demand, yet there is a paper that studies the price elasticity of different types of fruit in Scotland.

That paper is by Cesar Revoredo-Giha and Wojciech Florkowski and unfortunately it does not mention any numbers about the level of demand, in particular compared to other regions. The paper, like many papers in agricultural economics has a very narrow focus and it is not clear at all why it would be of interest to anybody outside of Scotland (or even in Scotland, visibly). Is there any lesson to be learned for the rest of us? Anything that could generalize? Some policy implication to get people to eat more healthily? The paper was prepared for a conference in Poland. Why would the paper be of interest there?

Why is the agricultural sector still protected in the US?

While most industrialized economies are strong advocates for free trade, they somehow manage to make an exception for the agricultural sector. I cannot think of one country that would not subsidize its farms in some major way and this despite the facts that we are far from witnessing a food shortage and that the agricultural sector by now constitutes a voting block that can safely be called small. So why do elected official keep pandering to farmers?

Marc Bellemare and Nicholas Carnes look at this question in the case of the United States. Using roll call votes from the US Congress and congress member ratings by the Farm Bureau, they find that electoral incentives in fact still do matter, while personal preferences and lobbying are less important. Could it be that the median voter is a farmer? I do not think this is what the paper is saying. Indeed, the variable "electoral incentive" is based on the proportion of the electorate that works in the agricultural sector. But it is above half, or approaching this, in few districts. In fact, Bellemare and Carnes restrict the variable to farm owners and managers, who are the ones really benefiting from the subsidies, and they comprise a tiny portion of the electorate in every district. (Of course, this measure is correlated with the total farm population.) For this influence of such a minority to still carry the vote, it must be that there is still lobbying going on, and of the sort that is not captured by the agricultural political actions committees that the authors use to control for lobbying. Maybe individual donations? Somehow, it always boils down to lobbying in the United States.

Milk quota markets are not efficient

Many countries have some sort of rationing system in place for their dairy industry, because apparently farmers have a tendency to produce too much milk and depress its price, in the end getting less, I guess because the price elasticity of demand is high. This rationing is typically done through a quota system, and these quotas are sometimes tradable. This last point is important as it makes it possible for the allocation to be efficient: the most efficient producers should indeed acquire more quotas, which they buy from the least productive farmers.

Rebecca Elskamp and Getu Hailu tell us this is not at all what is happening in Ontario, Canada. Elskamp and Hailu identify quota net buyers and sellers and they try to match them with various characteristics. As the milk sale price is uniform, it must have to do with production and costs. The latter do not seem to matter at all. Scale does, though. Thus, if you are a farmer who happens to have an empty barn, you buy quotas whether your costs are high or not. But if you are a very inefficient farmer with high costs, you do not think of selling your entire quota and live from it. Strange.

How much did the Gulf Oil Spill cost to shrimp consumers?

When the Deepwater Horizon oil platform exploded in 2010 and polluted much of the Gulf of Mexico Coast, some of the loudest complaints came for shrimpers fearing rightfully for their livelihood. The subsequent debate on how much the polluters should pay has been in part fueled by the question of how high the economic costs of the spill are, with a focus on repairing the pollution on the coast and in the water, as well as the economic costs to those living in the area. Ignored in all of this are damages to people outside of the region, for example shrimp consumers.

Addison Ellis, Jaclyn Kropp and Michael Norton identify for this case three sources of damages: higher prices, substitution to less liked goods, and added stigma from consuming Gulf shrimp (because it was perceived to be more risky). For the two first, they estimate the loss of consumer surplus to about US$100 million. For the third, they performed a series of experiments in 2010 to elicit from participants their willingness to pay for various types of shrimps. The stigma is reflected in a willingness to pay US$1.10 less per half-pound for Gulf shrimp. In terms of overall cost, my calculation indicates this would increased it by a little less than US$400 million, as 80,000 metric tons of shrimp were produced in the Gulf in 2010 (note the spill occurred on the 10th of April). Not small potatoes.

About agricultural policies in developing economies

Policy advice and intervention in the poorest developing economies are all about agricultural policy. How to increase crop yields, how to select crops, how to empower various players, how to get them onto markets. The results, overall, have been dismal: the poorest countries have grown less than the world average, thus they are getting even poorer in relative terms. The reaction to this? Thinking even harder about agricultural policy and intervention.

A recent example is a paper by Erik Jonasson, Mateusz Filipski, Jonathan Brooks and Edward Taylor that builds an elaborate model that tries to understand why some farmers do not participate in markets, which should help in specialization and reaping gains from it. They then evaluate the impact of various policies, and find some could lead to improvements in welfare, but nothing dramatic.

Yet, the most important change that should be contemplated is completely absent from this paper: getting subsistence farmers away from agriculture altogether. Obviously, they are not living in areas that are good for farming, so why to reinforce their dependence on the wrong trade. Countries with excess of labor supply should rather industrialize and import if necessary food. This is where the gains from specialization (and trade) are.

Is index-based weather insurance useful?

Whenever you are facing a risk, you want to be able to hedge against it (at least if you are risk averse). For this, there are all sorts of insurance policies. There are also markets in all sorts of instruments that allow you to find the right contingent claim for your situation. This includes farmers (and others) who want to hedge against meteorological risks. If you crop yields depend on weather patterns, you are looking for securities that pay out depending on some weather statistic. And they are available and have been heavily pushed by aid agencies in developing countries.

Chiratan Banerjee and Ernst Berg say they may not be such a great idea. They take the examples of rice farmers in the Philippines who bought wind-speed based indexes on the hypothesis that rice yields are lower when there are typhoons. But rice is remarkably resistant to typhoons and wind in general, the reason why it is so popular in the region in the first place. This means that rice farmers are heavily over-insured. That is especially bad and farmers are now confused about the concept of insurance as it looks like they face more risk than before.

Seemingly unrelated regressions and lamb carcasses

The great thing about the Internet is that one can discover unexpected uses of familiar techniques. Or one can search for new applications with one's tool set. So what about SUR and lamb carcasses?

Vasco Cadavez and Arne Henningsen are responsible for this paper. I have nothing to add to the abstract: The aim of this study was to develop and evaluate models for predicting the carcass composition of lambs. Forty male lambs of two different breeds were included in our analysis. The lambs were slaughtered and their hot carcass weight was obtained. After cooling for 24 hours, the subcutaneous fat thickness was measured between the 12th and 13th rib and the total breast bone tissue thickness was taken in the middle of the second sternebrae. The left side of all carcasses was dissected into five components and the proportions of lean meat, subcutaneous fat, intermuscular fat, kidney and knob channel fat, and bone plus remainder were obtained. Our models for carcass composition were fitted using the SUR estimator which is novel in this area. The results were compared to OLS estimates and evaluated by several statistical measures. As the models are intended to predict carcass composition, we particularly focused on the PRESS statistic, because it assesses the precision of the model in predicting carcass composition. Our results showed that the SUR estimator performed better in predicting LMP and IFP than the OLS estimator. Although objective carcass classification systems could be improved by using the SUR estimator, it has never been used before for predicting carcass composition.

Convergence in recessions

Growth theory and data teach us that, at least in developed countries, economies tend to converge in the long run: the dispersion across regions or nations of per capita income (or similar indicators) tends to decline. While this is a long term phenomenon, there is a priori no reason to believe this is a constant process.

Eldon Ball, Carlos San Juan and Camilo Ulloa study total factor productivity in agriculture across US states. While they indeed find a general trend towards convergence, it turns out that its speed is much faster during recessions. Why would this happen? If we follow Schumpeter, the worst firms should be dropping out during a recession, thereby relatively increasing TFP in the worst areas. And voilà, you have faster convergence. But only farm-level data would tell whether my conjecture is true.

Aid and remittances as hedges against food price shocks

Food is a substantial part of household expenses in developing economies, and in many of the latter foreign aid and remittances from emigrants provide a substantial part of national income. As world food prices have been subject to large fluctuations lately, causing much grief and even riots, it is natural to ask whether aid and remittances can provide some smoothing against the effects of these fluctuations.

Jean-Louis Combes, Christian Ebeke, Mireille Ntsama Etoundi and Thierry Yogo use a cross-country panel data set to study this question. First, they confirm that food fluctuations have a notable impact on aggregate consumption, especially in the poorest economies. Second they find that aid and remittances do help, and remittances seem to be more efficient at hedging. Indeed, an aid-to-GDP ratio of 29% is theoretically necessary to absorb food price fluctuations, while 9% is sufficient is for remittances. Only Mozambique and Nicaragua satisfy the first, while a few more countries satisfy the second.

The economic behavior of bees

I find it fascinating that there is also plenty of Economics in the animal kingdom. Two recent papers about bees just caught my attention.

Antoine Champetier studies the interaction of bees and farmers, as bees play an important role in pollination and are thought to be subject to a mysterious decline in numbers. He takes California almonds as an example and builds a model of pollination supply with hive owners and bees that forage. One aspect appears to be rather important: economies of scale in the hive, as larger hives have an easier time regulating the temperature and can devote more time to more aggressive foraging. Champetier formulates a spatial model of foraging and coordination in the bee colony, where energy used and gained by foraging is assessed, as well as time costs in each step of pollen acquisition and storage.

Noam Bar-Shai, Tamar Keasar and Avi Shmida study what makes that a bee departs early or stays longer in a flower patch. Looking at videos, they concluded that bees cannot count, but are rather governed by clues left by odor marks (to prevent revisiting the same flowers) and current foraging success.

Pollution has an impact on worker productivity

Pollution regulation is typically cast as a game between citizens and firms, the first suffering the consequences of pollution while the second are the origin of the pollution. In such a case, there is no incentive for firms to abate pollution, and the government has to mediate. But could a case be made that firms should be willing, individually or collectively, to reduce pollution. One way can be green labeling, which could increase the demand for their products. Another would be if firms realize pollution has an impact on their on productivity or on the labor supply.

Joshua Graff Zivin and Matthew Neidell take the worker productivity angle by using a dataset of dairy farm workers from a large farm in the Central Valley of California. In particular, they look how ozone levels impact the output of piece rate workers. At it is substantial. For example, a 10 ppb reduction of ozone increases productivity by 4.2%, noting that the standard deviation of ozone levels is 13 ppb. And if you object that some of the workers fall under minimum wage law and may not exert the right effort, be reassured, the authors took that into account. In addition, this impact happens even when the ozone level is well below the current national standards. Realizing this, industry should be more willing to accept the suggested tightening of pollution standards for ozone, and for nitrogen oxides and volatile organic chemicals that are the source of ground-level ozone.

Does it make sense to subsidize biofuels?

Ina relatively short time, biofuels have become remarkably popular, especially as an additive to regular petroleum based fuel. This is at least in part due to massive subsidies from the US to fuel and corn producers. As biofuels compete with food, this has lead to major price increases for corn and sugar, with adverse consequences for importing countries. This begs the question: is it actually a good idea to subsidize biofuels? I mentioned previously that it is preferable to tax other energy products rather than subsidize alternative energies (1, 2), but let us revisit this issue.

Subhayu Bandyopadhyay, Sumon Bhaumik and Howard Wall use a general equilibrium trade model and confirm that if there is a Pigovian tax on conventional fuels, subsidies are not needed. But if the Pigovian tax is not available or too low (as is the case in the US), then a subsidy for biofuels makes sense, But if the country in question is large, there are other implications through increased worldwide demand for food. In that case, a food exporter wants to subsidize biofuels and tax conventional fuels. A food importing country would only want to subsidize biofuels if the pollution reduction effect is large enough.

Hector Nuñez, Hayri Önal, Madhu Khanna, Xiaoguang Chen and Haixiao Huang look more specifically at the interaction of policies in the US and Brazil, the two largest producers of biofuels. Indeed, the US imposes a special tariff on the importation of biofuels, in particular the more advanced sugarcane based one from Brazil. Brazil is also the largest producer and exporter of beef. The paper uses a multi-country, multi-good model, unfortunately with a partial equilibrium, but it takes into account possible crop rotations and different categories of land. It concludes that eliminating the tariffs would significantly reduce biofuel production in the US, with the latter importing biofuels from Brazil and exporting corn. While this reduces producer welfare compared to the status quo, it increases consumer welfare. Given the political system in the US, guess what will happen.

Paying farmers for landscaping

Switzerland has had for centuries a rather unique system of communal land tenure for the alpine areas. Indeed, cattle owners send their livestock up from the villages for the Summer season, and these grazing areas are commonly owned and rights to them are inherited. The returns of agriculture in the mountainous areas are, however, far from competitive in this era of globalization, and Switzerland has resorted to compensating farmers for keeping the cows up there. The reason is that cows and some other farming bring landscaping benefits, for example keeping the grass short improves snow management for avalanche prevention and skiing, or preserves biodiversity and prevents invasive plants to take foothold. These direct payments are very close to making farmers civil servants. Note that payments depend on the size of the farm, its location, the treatment of animals and the general ecological friendliness of the business.

A pair of recent papers analyze the new situation for farmers in the Swiss Alps. Chiara Calabrese and Gabriele Mack used an agent-based model to study how incomes of a large number of heterogeneous livestock farmer families would evolve until 2020. Different scenarios are explored (a not described status quo, more subsidy for summered livestock and lump sum subsidy to all alpine farmers proportional to farmed area). Results are not unexpected (no change, more summered livestock and income, less of both). Prices are assumed to grow at a steady rate unknown to reader. Give the recent wide fluctuations for food, that needs to be made more explicit and additional scenarios are needed. Also, this study basically assumes that the government does not face a budget constraint and will always be willing whatever it takes to maintain a policy. At least the costs of the program should be reported.

The other study by Nadja El Benni, Stefan Mann and Bernard Lehmann looks at how these direct payments to farmers influence the distribution of incomes. Due to the terrain, farms are small almost everywhere in the country, and Gini coefficients for farmer income have been rather low compared to other countries. The new policy increased the Gini coefficients even though the payments were implemented in part to redistribute income and they constitute now 79% of a farmers income. The reason is that the disparities in market income have increased tremendously and direct payments are tied to farm size after all.

Time for an agricultural revolution in Africa?

When you think about income differences across the world, Africa is really depressing. It seems nothing is making a lasting impact in terms of policy for it to catch up with the others, and seeing how Asia managed to transform itself makes you wonder what is fundamentally wrong. While one may think this has to do with misguided policies, so much has been tried that something ought to have stuck. But no. One thing that helped Asia is that evolution in rice brought an agricultural revolution that freed human resources for manufacturing, so could such a revolution also happen in Africa?

Donald Larson, Keijiro Otsuka, Kei Kajisa, Jonna Estudillo and Aliou Diagne claim that several areas in Africa are suitable for rice, but local diets and tastes are too diverse for rice to have the success it had in Asia. The productivity of other crops needs to improve as well. So it does not look like there is a ready-made solution that will kick-start the agricultural revolution soon, despite some very localized successes.

That said, why insist of improving agriculture on a continent that is visibly not appropriate for this? Much like telecommunications in Africa jumped over landlines directly to mobile telephony, why not bypass agricultural development straight to manufacturing? One argument against this is the large transportation costs that make local agriculture essential and manufacturing away from the ports unprofitable. But why insist on keeping the population on the countryside? Why not develop coastal cities and take advantage from returns to scale there, like Singapore and Hong Kong did, and

Is fair trade unfair?

US colleges make big money from the sale of all sorts of items imprinted with their logo, in particular clothes. Of course, to maximize the margins on these goods, their production has been mostly outsourced off-shore, to factories that were often likened to sweatshops. Whether a large portion of those factories were indeed providing substandard working conditions is a debate I do not want to enter for now. The fact is that student activists demanded that those factories should not be retained for production. As universities and their suppliers complied, the poorest workers were out of a job, and the university gift stores are making less of a profit. Unintended consequences.

Aurélie Carimentrand and Jérôme Ballet explore a similar story with fair trade. Their case study is about quinoa from Bolivia. The goal of fair trade is to give local producers in developing countries a larger share of the retail price of their product. But beneficiaries need to get certified, and this process does not necessarily favor the most needy, in particular as they need to obey some rules. In the case of Bolivian quinoa, this works through the membership in a growers' association which markets crops to fair trade networks. As associations typically are, this one is dominated by the big producers. The latter are located in the big plains, where they could get the full advantage of mechanization. The small producers are on steep terrain and cannot use tractors. The latter are the poorest, but, as the authors argue, they benefit the least from fair trade, often even skipping membership. Indeed, the association pays the same unit price to all members, and given the differences in production costs, this exacerbates inequalities.

The authors claim that fair trade has failed here. It made inequities among producers worse. But was domestic income equality really the primary role? Isn't it really about world income inequality? There, clearly fair trade is transferring some rents to developing economies. Whether they are large enough to be worth the trouble is another question.

How could price risk hedging be bad for producers?

When one faces fluctuations in income, it seems quite natural to find some way to insure yourself. For farmers, price fluctuations can be a serious problem, especially with non-diversified crops. In developing economics, this insurance was provided by commodity marketing boards. But as their margins kept increasing, fueling incredible corruption, they have been abandoned virtually everywhere. Instead, the World Bank has been advocating commodity futures, where farmers can hedge their risk. In principle this looks like the perfect thing to do.

But there are some pitfalls, as Sasha C. Breger Bush argues. First, farmers may face margin calls, and given the wide fluctuations in the underlying prices, this can be devastating if you have little assets to meet those calls. The weakest thus go bankrupt, facing essentially something like a gambler's ruin. Second, hedging provides the wrong incentives if farmers do not understand that current low prices mean that their supply should be reduced and they should diversify. Clearly, it is not obvious to find a mechanism that allows farmers to whether price fluctuations while still letting the price influence demand and supply the way it should.

Why Japanese farms are so small

Why are Japanese farms so small and so inefficient/ As usual under such circumstances, this is because they are protected through subsidies and zoning laws. But why? No matter what the country, agriculture enjoys protection. Some reasons, depending on the country, may include resistance to change, preservation of the landscape, preservation of traditions and securing wartime food for the country. All this can explain why the agricultural sector is subsidized and then inefficient, but that does not explain why Japanese farms are small. They could still merge.

Yoshihisa Godo finds an explanation from political economy. Japanese farmers can make more money from manipulating farmland regulation than from farming itself. In other words, they are extracting rents from holding a regulated asset. For example, as a land-owner, you get money if you preserve its agricultural purpose, and the more prone to conversion to other uses the location is, the more you get. That explains why you would find rice paddies in the middle of dense cities. But when an opportunity arises, farmers convince ("manipulate") authorities to convert the classification of the land to cash in on its market value.

Godo links this to a misunderstanding of democracy, in that people only care for themselves and do not see the consequences for the others. While it may be true that people in Japan a century ago may have been less selfish, the current problem is one of deficient institutions, not deficient people. That institutions cannot be changed may very well be an issue of lobbying and rent-seeking, but you cannot blame it on citizen having little regard on the duties in participatory democracy. Godo's main point is that people complain when a zoning change hurts them, and then exploit other zoning changes for their own gain. He also complains that those hurt ask for compensation. Yet, good economics would precisely ask for such compensation, a very Coasian argument. It would also ask for those who gain to pay for such privilege. This is where Japan is lacking, and once this is implemented, land would be used much more efficiently. Making this happen could very well be a political problem, but it has nothing to do with an implied lack of servitude of the average voter.

PS: I hate it when a paper starts on page 9.

Posting calories in restaurants is Pareto improving

With increasing frequency, it is proposed that restaurants should post on their menus nutritional information. The restaurants resist this because they think it may shoo customers away, or at least make them eat less (assuming they underestimated the calories, which may not be always true). But if they eat less, why not make portions smaller and thus reduce costs and possibly increase profits?

Bryan Bollinger, Phillip Leslie and Alan Sorensen observed Starbucks outlets in New York City as such a calorie posting policy was implemented. They got data about each transaction in a NYC outlet for a 14-month period, including 11 months with calorie postings, as well as in Boston and Philadelphia, which act as control groups. They finding that the posting reduced calories per transaction by 14 units, 10 coming from fewer purchases and 4 from switching to a lower calorie item. You may think this would be bad for Starbucks? Think again, there was no significant change in revenue, in fact there was even a 3% increase for Starbucks outlets close to Dunkin Donuts: the calorie posting attracted clients from competitors.