A debt-free stimulus?

Economies may need to be stimulated sometimes, through tax reductions or public expenditures. The problem is that this costs. Opposition to such stimulus programs is typically grounded on the unavoidable debt run-up, which implies that at some point in the future taxes will need to be raised at a level that is higher than before the stimulus. Would there be a way to pacify this opposition?

According to Laurence Seidman there is. It involves the Federal Reserve, or the corresponding central bank, making a loan to the government treasury for the amount engaged in the stimulus, and then the Fed conveniently forgiving this debt. That is a different way of putting what Seidman proposes: the Fed makes simply a transfer to the Treasury that satisfies the dual mandate of the Fed, full employment and stable prices. Despite what Seidman claims, this is monetizing the debt. Even if no debt is explicitly created, the government is still financing its stimulus by (virtually) printing money, and with the same effect on inflation which guarantees that the dual mandate will not be satisfied for stable prices, and one can have doubts about full employment, too. Seidman argues that there would be no inflation if aggregate demand gets back to the "normal" level with the stimulus. But you still have increased the money supply for the same quantity of goods. The price level needs to increase accordingly. The only way to avoid the inflation is if the Treasury returns the transfer to the Fed. The transfer is thus again a debt.

I find it really strange that a chaired professor at the University of Delaware would write this. The only way I can rationalize his writing is that he confuses real and nominal quantities. He also seems to reason in partial equilibrium, not thinking that prices adjust to such large changes in macroeconomic aggregates, especially in the medium run. We are used to seeing this from crackpots with little economics education, but not with apparently well-educated economists.

Ageing and deflation in Japan

Inflation rates across industrialized economies have been remarkably low in the past decades, and at the same time these economies have been subject to considerable demographic ageing. Nowhere has this been more true than in Japan. What are the government's or the central bank's incentives to set policy that triggers lower inflation if the population gets older? I do not see where monetary policy would matter, but the fiscal theory of inflation may tell us something.

Hideki Konishi and Kozo Ueda study the latter in an overlapping generation model where the fiscal authority has a shorter lifespan than residents, but takes into account the impact of its actions on future governments. The fiscal theory of the price level tells us that inflation goes up when more debt is accumulated, and that is certainly the case when the population gets older and requires more retirement benefits. But the authors point out that this does not necessarily hold once you take into account the endogenous responses of income tax rates and public expenses. Then, because of the policy response it matters why the ageing is happening: lower mortality or lower fertility. Deflation is more likely in the former case. Now we just need someone to bring this to the data...

Why firms do not like cutting wages

Nominal wage downward rigidity is a feature of many macro-models that help justify positive optimal inflation rates. In fact, that is pretty much the only way to get a monetary monetary model not to conclude that the Friedman Rule and its deflation is optimal. This rigidity is always assumed on the presumption that somehow employers and employees do not like to reduce nominal wages. Are they subject to a nominal fata morgana or is there more to it? Instead of pontificating from theory and limited data, maybe asking market participants could help.

Philip Du Caju, Theodora Kosma, Martina Lawless, Julian Messina and Tairi Rõõm conducted a survey of firms across 14 European countries. They conclude that issues with unions contracts or collective bargaining were of secondary importance to worker morale and staff retention. This means that including renegotiation costs seems misguided. This does, however, not explain why this is so important to staff morale. After all, what really matters is the real wage. What is this psychological factor that makes us think foremost in nominal terms? Or is it that managers only have the impression that this matters? What we need here is some experimental data where some employees are hit with a nominal wage decrease and others not, and see whether it makes a difference. Good luck finding a manager willing to do that, though. And I wonder whether the surveys results would be different in economies where the social mission of employers is less developed.

Uncertain times and price setting

Much has been written, including here, about how policy uncertainty is bad for business. Firms do not want to invest much when it is not clear what lies ahead in terms of fiscal policy, for example. This is particularly bad in countries where such uncertainty is chronic. If fiscal authorities or the government cannot get their act together, maybe the central bank can.

Isaac Baley and Julio Blanco show that if firms face uncertainty, monetary policy has less bite. The reason lies in the endogenous price formation (no Calvo fairy here). Specifically, firms are modeled to forecast their nominal costs, but the learning process is obviously imperfect. As the forecast variance increases, for example due to uncertainty about after tax returns, firms become more sensitive to new information and adjust prices more frequently, paying a menu cost. This effect is stronger than their urge to wait-and-see in the face of uncertainty. All this accelerates the transmission of information about the monetary policy, further dampening its impact. In other words, an ineffective government renders the central bank less effective as well.

China is doing is right with managing its exchange rate

China has been heavily criticized by western politicians and policy-makers for its exchange rate policy that favors its export industry. Some have tried to explain to Chinese authorities that it is not in their best interest to follow a quasi-fixed exchange rate with the US dollar. Indeed, we know from past experience that fixed-exchange rates can be very expensive to maintain, especially in the context of large external imbalances. But is China different? After all, it financial development is
clearly less advanced than Western economies, and the Chinese economy is growing much faster.

Philippe Bacchetta, Kenza Benhima and Yannick Kalantzis look at the optimal exchange-rate policy of a growing economy where domestic households do not have access to international markets, that is, China. They find that the optimal path for the exchange rate is first a real depreciation during a growth spurt, and then a real appreciation in the long-run. This is pretty much what China has been applying. In other words, China did everything right given its situation, and this is because the growth spurt generates a glut of savings that have nowhere to go. The real depreciation allows to take care of this current account imbalance having the central bank serve as intermediary and converting foreign assets to domestic ones for the desperate households. In some sense, we could even argue that the Bank of China has not done enough of that given the real estate bubble, which is also a consequence of this savings glut.

The experimental macroeconomics of monetary policy

One important characteristic of Economics is that it is very difficult to conduct a clean experiment. While one may run little laboratory experiments with a few chosen subjects, there is always the uncertainty whether the experiment generalizes. The randomized experiments typically used in development economics are subject to the same limitations, even if their scope is larger. And in all those experiments, their applicability is limited to microeconomic questions.

Oleksiy Kryvtsov and Luba Petersen venture into experiments directly applicable for macroeconomic policy, and more precisely monetary policy. Monetary policy has bite when there are some frictions, among them expectation formation. Their idea is thus to see how people form inflation expectations in a laboratory setting and within the context of a standard new-Keynesian model. In that model with economic agents having rational expectations, monetary policy can reduce macroeconomic volatility by at least two-thirds. With the bit of irrationality exhibited by participants to the experiment, the reduction is still about half, and thus important. The model is a Woodford-style economy where participants have to provide updates on inflation and output-gap expectations, which can be compared by the observer against rational expectations ones. People learn about changes to fundamentals and can draw on past history. In other words, it is like they would live in the Matrix, they are fed information and are supposed to behave within the confines of a virtual world.

This is very interesting and innovative stuff here. I must concede though that I have still not bought the Woodford model. I cannot understand how one can talk about monetary policy in model with supposedly fundamentals when there is no money.

Identifying monetary policy "shocks"

I have always found the empirical monetary policy literature rather frustrating. It is entirely based on the premise that one can identify monetary policy shocks. First, I am not sure what is really meant by a shock. Is it any change in a policy variable? Not changing it may be a surprise, as we recently witnessed by with the recent FOMC decision not to throttle quantitative easing. And how much a change is anticipated matters as well. The recent emphasis on forward guidance makes the interpretation of an interest change very different from the surprise actions from a few years ago. Second, the empirical identification of those shocks seems doubtful at best. Either you take a VAR and interpret residuals as shocks (never mind those will be significantly different across specifications), or you try to quantify some narrative of policy decisions, sorting out rather subjectively what was a surprise and what was expected. Third, a monetary policy shock should be measured differently under different policy regimes. There is no point on focusing on the Federal funds rates (or a Taylor rule) when the policy focuses on the money supply, for example.

The reason for this rant is that I came across a paper by Martin Kliem and Alexander Kriwoluzky who try to reconcile the VAR and narrative approaches, which of course is impossible. What they highlight though is that both are fraught with error. They find this by plugging the narrative measure into a VAR and they conclude that there is measurement error in the narrative measure and misspecification error in the VAR. That should surprise no one, but needs to be pointed up, with so many people relying blindly on these instruments.

The Economics of Christian Reformation

The social fabric of a country has a lot of inertia. It takes generations for norms to change, in large part because people rarely change during their lifetime, and if there is any change it is towards conservatism, that is, preserving the status quo. Yet sometimes change spreads quickly, like a revolution. In some sense we see this with the Arab Spring. All it needed was a small spark, and that spark may seem irrelevant at first. Another dramatic social change was the Christian Reformation that started with a simple priest in a completely irrelevant town of Saxony. Martin Luther was a spark that somehow set on fire an existing social norm, Catholicism, and set in motion a revolution that would keep Europe busy for centuries. How could this happen?

Philipp Robinson Rössner points out that central Germany suffered at the time from economic depression and deflation, at least partly as a consequence from a decline in silver supplies. This context deeply influenced Martin Luther's thinking, which found a receptive audience throughout the region. One thing that I take away from this is that the Reformation possibly happened because currency was tied to silver. Had the region had a modern central bank with fiat money, the money supply could have adapted to economic circumstances and the Reformation may have never happened. Europe would have suffered from much fewer wars, and the world's history (and economy) would have been quite different.

The central bank should be sector-agnostic

Large Scale Asset Purchases (LSAPs) of mortgage-backed securities have been a major component of recent monetary policy. It is not without critics as this is a policy that has been targeted towards a specific sector of the economy, the real estate sector. This is principle a big no-no, as a central bank should only care about the overall economy, not specific sectors or firms. In a similar fashion, the ECB has been criticized for buying out specific countries following conditions that were differentiated by country, instead of applying one rule to all, or even not buying country debt at all. But if all sectors benefit equally or if that was the most efficient way to conduct policy, that is all good.

In the case of LSAPs, Meixing Dai, Frédéric Dufourt and Qiao Zhang find it was certainly not the most efficient way to deal with a confidence shocks in the banking sector, and it obviously privileged the real estate industry. One could have done better by buying corporate bonds, but in a uniform manner across sectors. This works better than mortgage-backed securities because they are less leveraged and thus free up more bank capital. This is more true if financial markets are more segmented, that is, if bankers cannot freely reallocate resources between sectors. What the paper does not say is how this would have compared to a conventional policy, buying government bonds.

Taylor rules with assets and credit

One thing we have learned from the last recession is that the financial sector is quite important, that its dysfunction can have important consequences, and this can happen even in the most financially elaborate economy. Some thus call for the health of the financial sector to become a component of every policy maker's dashboard. From a dashboard it is only a small step to include the financial sector into a policy formula such as the Taylor Rule.

Leonardo Gambacorta and Federico Signoretti take that step by deriving from a DSGE model a Taylor Rule that includes asset prices and the amount of credit. So far so good, but why not also include the exchange rate? And more indicators? This is not the purpose of the Taylor Rule. It was devised to be a simple guide to policy, from which you want to deviate when circumstances call you to do so, for example with unconventional policies that cannot be captured with a Taylor Rule, simple or not. The best example is when the Taylor Rule calls for negative nominal interest rates. Would anybody blindly follow this? Of course not, and this is why we should stop thinking in terms of a single equation, especially when one has several policy goals. You needs at least as many instruments as goals. The policy interest rate cannot do everything.

Is an imperfect monetary union leading to more volatility?

The theory of optimal currency areas initiated by Robert Mundell states that a monetary union should be beneficial between regions that have labor and capital mobility, fiscal transfer mechanisms and synchronized business cycles, or at least something approaching these conditions. In the case of Europe, this is clearly not met, but I guess the hope was that these conditions would eventually be met. The literature has been been rather superficial on what it means to not quite meet these criteria and what the consequences are. Yet, we have now techniques to model this better and test policies that could improve outcomes.

Philipp Engler and Simon Voigts do this with a DSGE model where they explicit the market structure, following the situation in the current European Monetary Union: no labor mobility, imperfect goods market integration, incomplete financial markets, no fiscal transfers at business cycle frequency, and asymmetric shocks. They find that adding a monetary union to the mix increases the volatility of consumption and employment significantly, essentially because country-specific monetary policy cannot be enacted. What can be done then? Engler and Voigts show that area-wide fiscal policy can do a lot of good, and much more than isolated fiscal policy would. And this is exactly what is missing in Europe. Absent this, one could imagine increasing labor mobility, but the trend in Europe right now seems to go the other way, with several countries thinking about restricting immigration from member countries. European integration is hard.

Is money a factor of production?

An easy trick question to ask students about factors of production is whether money is one. Of course it is not, unless you consider burning it to fuel an oven. A factor of production is an input to the production process, such as capital, labor, raw materials, energy, etc. Money is only a facilitator in the acquisition of those goods. And if money or credit are constraining production, this belongs in a separate constraint, not in the production function.

Why do I mention this? Because money is occasionally put in a production function, and Jonathan Benchimol makes it even the focus and title of his paper. Why does he do that? He wants to estimate a New-Keynesian model and see whether money would matter in such a way. It does not. But who could really blame him for trying, as these models either have money in the utility function (few people enjoy money per se, most people enjoy what you can do with it, and that is already in the utility function) or no money at all (at still manage to draw lessons for monetary policy). In the kingdom of the blind men, those who are blessed with one eye are kings.

Optimal deviations from inflation targeting

When a central bank adopts a monetary policy target, such as a targeted inflation rate, should it absolutely adhere to this goal, or are deviations from the goal tolerated? This is not necessarily a rehash of the "rules versus discretion" question, as it is a question about the formulation of the policy rule. In other words, is it OK for a central bank that has a specific inflation target to use a rule that deviates from the target under specific circumstances?

Barbara Annicchiarico and Lorenza Rossi say this is OK, and these circumstances do not need to be extraordinary. The reason here is the often neglected impact of economic shocks, in particular technology shocks, on the growth potential of economy. Without the endogenous growth mechanism, the optimal policy of the central bank is to stick to the target. With it, it can deviate because the dynamics of the economy and the intertemporal trade-offs make it optimal to give a little bit of slack now to be in better shape in the future.

This reminds me about the silly debate about the ineffectiveness of central banks when inflation is below target when unemployment is still high. It is all about the dynamics of adjustment of the economy after a shock. Economic variable do not go back to long-run equilibrium in one shot, it takes time and they can be off long-run values even in equilibrium and under optimal policy.

Monetary stimulus in high-inflation regimes

In countries where inflation is high and highly variable, you would not expect that monetary policy is optimal in a social-welfare sense. After all, such inflation is a sign of political influence, and from politicians that do not have the good of the people in mind: strongly expansionary monetary policy before elections, financing government expenses with a hidden inflation tax instead of other visible taxes, and even just pocketing monetary injections. Still suppose that for some exogenous reason inflation is high and highly variable, is their still scope for optimal monetary policy (beyond working toward a long-term goal of getting this under control)?

Wojciech Charemza, Svetlana Makarova and Imran Shah claim that yes, the central bank still can do good. They claim that output can be stimulated with a monetary stimulus when inflation expectations are much higher than output-neutral inflation. The latter is obtained with a two variable VAR, and then the sign of the residuals is used to interpret asymmetric impulse responses. Like many VAR analyses, this is a little bit voodoo science, especially when you look at countries whose data records are poor if not manipulated. Of course, following this policy will not help in solving the inflation problem of these economies (defined as at least 4.8% inflation at least 25% of the time). But if expectations are much lower, then one can tighten monetary policy without big consequences. Unfortunately, a VAR cannot tell us why all this would be happening, only that there is a statistical coincidence.

And what if the Fed were to make a loss?

Whether you think the Fed's actions have been successful or not in pulling the US out of a deeper recession, you have to admit that the gigantic increase in its balance sheet has been hugely profitable. US$88,900,000,000.00 last year. US$79,300,000,000.00 the year before. Despite what conspiracy theorists want to believe, this money is not going into the pockets of private bankers, but to the US Treasury, which is coming to rely on it in these trying budgetary times.

But these profits are not going to last forever. When the economy is going to do better, interest rates will have to be brought to saner, normal levels. And this is going to happen by selling the assets the Fed has accumulated, and this is going to happen at a loss, a substantial loss. Who is going to pay for it. Indeed, the Fed is not provisioning for losses, first because it never made a loss, second possibly because the law may prevent it from doing so. So if it makes a loss, what is going to happen? I could just print money to cover it, but that would run counter the very policy it is trying to implement. Or the US Treasury could cover the losses. I am not quite sure that it stands ready to do so. And in such a circumstance, conspiracy theorists would have a field day.

I have not seen anybody mention anything about the exit strategy of the Fed. So this is all personal conjecture. Am I missing something? The only positive aspect I see in this is that this seems to be an interesting revenue smoothing mechanism for the government. Or, once more, the Fed doing fiscal policy instead on the government.

Value of gold: is this time really different?

Why is gold valued? is year in year out one of the most visited posts on this blog. For some reason that I still cannot fathom people care a lot about the value of gold. The fact that is does not have much fundamental value except for what people believe it is worth makes it almost as much a fiat currency as the money doom sayers want it to replace. Another repeated myth about gold is that its value is stable or can only go up, despite the fact that there have been some spectacular drops. Like now, where people claim that this time it is different, gold is the best refuge in the face of a major meltdown of various currencies. Or at least as a hedge against pending inflation.

Claude Erb and Campbell Harvey explore the role of gold as a hedge against inflation. It turns out gold is a very poor hedge, and if it were, it should be at half its current price. I guess this over-reaction can be attributed to herd-behavior, which nowhere as common as for gold. And with the real price of gold at twice the long term average, and the fact that mean reversion invariably kicks in, sooner or later the price is going to go significantly down. Always has, always will. This time is no different.

If gold has a useful property, it is a very good hedge against inflation in the very long run. We are talking centuries here. Erb and Harvey compare the pay of Roman and US soldiers in gold and find that they are remarkably similar. But this means also that gold does not have returns that are in any way comparable to equity. We are taking here about returns that are a small fraction of a percent. Hardly a good investment. Also, gold is no good currency hedge either, as its fluctuations are so big that they drown out the fluctuations in exchange rates. Etc. Erb and Harvey go through a series of other arguments why gold should be held, and none seems to hold water. But gold is shiny.

The Fed is very good at forecasting inflation, obviously

There was a time where central banks liked to surprise markets. Macroeconomic theory dictated then that central banks should be secretive and could only be effective if they could fool the market's expectations or play on the fact they have some privileged information. After the disastrous inflation of the 1970's, central banks have completely reverse course and are now models of openness. They go as far as publishing their economic forecasts, even with various scenarios, explain in great detail their policy, in some cases even publishing the Taylor rule they follow. Is there still some asymmetric information left? If central banks still manage to forecast information better than markets, then yes.

Bedri Kamil Onur Tas uses the Fed's Green Book forecasts for inflation and the federal funds rate, which are released with a five year delay, to find that the reason the Fed has better forecasts is that its FFR forecasts, which is its own policy instrument, are used and are better than the market's forecasts of the FFR. What this long sentence means is that the Fed knows better its future policy stance, and it uses this efficiently in its inflation forecast. What this also means is that the Fed could still improve the way it communicates its policy intentions.

European tourism and the Euro

If you have traveled across Europe before the introduction of the Euro, you have certainly been annoyed by the frequent changing of currencies. Not only did you need to worry about getting cash at the border, you also had tp learn about new denominations, rethink the prices you see, and end up with unused loose change (ignoring the exchange risk one faces as well). With the introduction of the Euro, all this has been greatly simplified, even if not all countries joined. Beyond the convenience for the tourist, has this spurred additional tourism.

María Santana Gallego, Jorge Vicente Pérez Rodríguez and Francisco Jos&e;eacut Ledesma Rodríguez ask this question and find that, yes, it had a positive impact, to the tune of 20 to 40% for EMU country tourist arrivals, and mostly so after 2002 (when Euro coins and notes were introduced) in contrast to 1999 (when the exchange rates were fixed). In addition, there is evidence of tourism diversion: The stated increases occurred to the detriment of non-EMU countries. In other words, tourists substituted away from countries that are not carrying the Euro.

PS: Things seem to be looking a bit better for Greece right now. But if it were still to be dropped from the Euro-zone, consider a substantial negative impact on its vital tourism industry.

How Japan financed WWII

71 years today, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor and opened a new front in its global war. Why would a relatively small country take on a much larger adversary when it is already stretched with other wars and occupations? In particular, how do you find the resources to wage such wars, and by resources I mean not just the financing but also the physical resources?

Gregg Huff and Shinobu Majima offer part of the answer by looking at the financing of the Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia. Japan had a strategy that invading troops needed to be self-sufficient. This means that they had to either confiscate (tax) or acquire goods through money creation. To a large extend, the latter was performed through the issuance of military scrip, which is unbacked military notes, along with bilateral clearing arrangements with the occupied countries. This allowed not only to finance local occupation but also transfer substantial resources to Japan, in the case of Indochina up to a third of its GDP.

You would think that money creation on such a massive scale would create hyperinflation or at least high inflation. That does not seem to be the case, at least in the sense that the price levels increased as much as the money supply. One could have expected that given the circumstances inflation would have been significantly higher than money growth if market participants were forward-looking and money velocity would increase (think of hyperinflation à la Cagan). Huff and Majima trace this missing hyperinflation to the fact that money was needed to act as a medium of exchange and store of value, despite very substantial seigniorage taxes. There was not viable alternative, in part because of Japanese coercion. I think this would not have worked in more modern economies where more assets are available.

How many dollars are abroad?

If you divide the amount of US dollars in circulation by the number of people living in the United States, you get an amount in the order of $3000. This is quite stunning, yet could be explained by various factors: money held in freezers and mattresses, money held by businesses, money used in the underground economy, lost money, and money held abroad. The latter is usually thought to make the bulk of it, given the status of the US dollar as an international reserve currency and its use as a parallel currency in several countries (if not full dollarization).

Edgar Feige thinks that in facts less than a quarter is abroad, but there is considerable uncertainty. For one, confidential data about dollar movements abroad has been made public, and official estimates need to be revised down. Also, indirect methods used to estimate this share seems to deeply flawed and very sensitive to their assumptions. But, somehow, it is still noticeable that the demand for dollars abroad declined with the emergence of the Euro as a viable alternative. One consequence of all this uncertainty and likely downward revision is that estimates on the size of the shadow economy that rely on money demand are wrong as well, something I actually complained about recently.