When countries manipulate economic data

Conspiracy theorists have a field day whenever official statistics look conveniently better just before elections. Whether statistics are really manipulated for political gain is hopefully less frequent than what they assume. We know it is currently done in Argentina, was done by the Soviets and their allies, and used to be done by some countries to qualify as poor in the United Nations' eyes. Those cases were rather obvious, but how could you recognize the more subtle ones?

Tomasz Michalski and Gilles Stoltz use Benford's Law, the distribution of first digits in economic figures, to determine the likelihood of manipulation across a large set of countries. While this does not catch a country red-handed, it gives probabilities, and one can analyze this against a set of indicators to determine what would drive them to cheat. Michalski and Stoltz find that higher likelihood of cheating is associated with fixed exchange rates, high negative assets, negative current accounts or subject to capital flow reversals. So it seems that this kind of cheating is not for internal consumption, but rather to deceive international financial markets. The authors did the analysis on balance of payments data, though, so the picture may be quite different when looking at unemployment, GDP or inflation data.

How politicians lie

We all know politicians lie, no surprise here. What we do not quite know is how and why they lie. Indeed, they generally do not tell outright lies. They exaggerate or add some "extra spice" to their statements. How badly they lie likely depends on the political context.

Alessandro Bucciol and Luca Zarri, from a country long lead by a professional liar, decide to focus on politicians from the United States. They use data from PolitiFact.com about 7000 claims by 1000 national politicians from 2007 to 2012. They determine that Republications lie more than Democrats, which should not surprise given the influence of the Tea Party on Republicans. I am thus not sure this ranking will last once the Republican Party gets back to its roots. More interesting are variations across party lines. Politicians lie less in battleground states (when the stakes, or scrutiny, are higher), in more educated states, and in the South. And health-related issues are the subject of the most lies.

I am not quite sure how to generalize these results. As mentioned, the current context for the Republican Party is out of the ordinary. Also, health care has been a central issue on the national political agenda over these years. All this can change, and it may be different in other countries. But it is interesting to see that definite patterns are emerging. If we can rationalize them, maybe we can then think about policies that would minimize lying. And hope for politicians to adopt them. A good resolution for the new year.

Early uses of accounting: to help in firm management or to pursue an agenda?

You may think that accounting practices are straightforward and have been in place for a long time. Actually, good practices are actually fairly recent, especially in terms of making them useful diagnostic tools for firm management. But with sophistication comes also the temptation to become creative and use accounting for purposes that are borderline legal, such as escaping taxation, or outright fraud. For this, you would need to be a sophisticated accountant, and one would think that one would not find such sophistication a century ago, let alone during the British Industrial Revolution.

Steven Toms and Alice Shepherd show that in the second case there were surprising sophistication, with creative accounting being used by industrialists to counter the "Ten-Hour" movement that sought to limit work hours. Specifically, they show how the the numbers from a cotton manufacturer were used in the policy debate and how his creative accounting made it appear as though he was facing excruciatingly high fix costs and thus low profits. Where he got creative is with the treatment of capital accumulation, thereby proving that the accusation of making most of his supposedly high profits during the last hour of the shifts was not true.

Lack of transparency at the American Economic Association

I have complained several times on this blog about how the American Economic Association is run, particularly how its executive and committees are constituted almost exclusively of faculty from the very top universities, and mostly private universities, see the current slate of officers (Past posts: 1, 2, 3, 4). This lack of representation leads to apparent nepotism in the distribution of awards, and this can lead to suspicions of the same for acceptances to its annual meeting program (especially the printed, unrefereed proceedings) and to its journals. I have called in the past to write in at the elections a candidate that does not fit the profile of current AEA officers, but rather a common member of the association. But the AEA has only announced the winner of the election, with no vote tally. As this does not look very transparent, I enquired with the AEA Secretary-Treasurer, Peter Rousseau, whom I asked about full election results and how they are certified. Here is what he answered:

The long-standing policy of the AEA in reporting election results is to report only names of those elected. This policy was re-visited by the Executive Committee several years ago. The minutes of that meeting state:

"A member requested that the number of votes for each candidate in the annual election of officers be reported publicly. Current policy is for the Secretary-Treasurer and Administrative Director to certify the vote counts, which are tabulated electronically, and to report only the names of the successful candidates. After an interesting economic and psychological analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of reporting individual vote counts, it was decided to retain the Association's policy of reporting only the qualitative outcome of the annual election of officers."

The bylaws clearly state that the Secretary certifies the results. Please be assured that it is my fiduciary responsibility to the membership as its agent to report those qualitative results accurately.

Thank you for supporting the AEA and its mission of encouraging economic research worldwide.

So it is the very executive committee that is suspect of inbreeding that is at the origin of this policy of obfuscation of the election results. And it is a member of the executive committee, the unelected Secretary, that certifies election results and only releases part of them. This is how dictators run sham elections.

The price of producing in a sinful sector

Many people avoid investing in certain types of firms they associate with unethical or sinful behavior. That would include tobacco companies, high polluters, alcohol, fire arms and defense industry, etc. That should lower the stock market return of these firms, but there is of course some arbitrage that negates these return differentials. Yet, is there some way in which being in a sinful sector is detrimental?

Stergios Leventis, Iftekhar Hasan and Emmanouil Dedoulis found one, and that is the cost of auditing. Auditing firms are extremely sensitive to their own reputations, and who they do business with is part of their reputation. The authors also argues that auditing firms perceive that sin firms bear higher business risk, perhaps because they deviate from social norms and require more scrutiny (risk of litigation, need for higher cash reserves). In the US, such companies end up paying a whooping 20% more in auditing and consultancy fees. I wonder where else they face higher costs (it is known they have higher capital costs). This means that their stock price should still be affected despite arbitrage.

Human capital and corruption

It is commonplace to assume that corruption is bad, although the evidence is far from clear about this. Empirical investigations are typically at the macro level and have very little to say about the micro channels of corruption. In fact there is very little structural modelling or estimation in this area.

Spyridon Boikos concentrates on the impact of corruption on the accumulation of human capital using an endogenous growth model. Two channels are investigated: the first is about public resources being misdirected being education and production sectors, and the second is complementarity between human and physical capitals. Putting this to the data, it is found that corruption does not have that much impact in the education sector, and it is conjectured that corruption does not have the same bite in the education sector as in the rest of the economy. I cannot help thinking that the model misses the big elephant in the room in terms of human capital and corruption: a very common form of corruption in this regard is bribing for entry into schools, passing exams and even getting diplomas. This means that the signalling effect of diplomas is getting lost, and hence the incentive to get an education vanishes, in particular for the talented ones. And for those who attend a school, there is little incentive to learn.

Insider bank runs

Bank runs occur when depositors believe a bank is insolvent. They rush to withdraw their deposits before everyone else as funds dry up. Who is first in the queue at the wicket? When such panics break out, they must originate somewhere, whether justified or not. In particular, somebody must have had some privileged information that there is a problem with this bank. I doubt bank runs start as the bank releases its latest numbers and everybody is surprised.

Rajkamal Iyer, Manju Puri and Nicholas Ryan got access to the deposit withdrawal logs from a bank that has been subject to two runs. The last one is particularly informative, as a regulatory audit found the bank insolvent, and despite this information being private the bank run ensued. It is then no surprise to see bank employees as the first ones to withdraw their funds, followed by depositors with uninsured funds, who are the most vulnerable and may have been tipped off by some employees. Insider information appears unavoidable and leaks to the public. It appears difficult to avoid a run when a bank is indeed insolvent, unless it comes as a sudden development over the week-end. As a policy maker, this means that you better make sure banks never become insolvent, or you end up always insuring the bad risks, those that do not have insider information.

On the virtues of honest apologies

Apologizing can be very hard, especially when your pride is hurt. And sometimes one opts for a fake apology, not really meaning it. But this does not really fool the apologizee, doesn't? Is the latter then unlikely to forgive? Of course, an economist has an answer to this question.

Verena Utikal performs a laboratory experiment wherein the dictator game is manipulated to sometimes keep outcomes out of the control of the dictator, who can send a message. The receiver can then act on outcome and message, but without knowing whether the outcome was a choice of the dictator. Dictators do send different messages depending on what happened, and receivers do detect lying and punish it. If you considering that there is a mental cost in lying, there does not seem to be much of a point in providing fake apologies. Yet people do it. And consider that in this experiment, all players were anonymous and did not see each other. Imagine in the real world, where they know and face each other. The cost of lying and faking must be even higher. Yet it still happens.

Cannibalism in Ireland

Cannibalism within most animal species arises only in extreme circumstances. It is not clear to me why this is less prevalent than intra-species killing, as the latter has a clear negative impact on the survival of the species, whereas eating already dead fellows has no impact. In any case, there is a huge taboo on cannibalism, and humans are no different. But it happens in extreme situations, and famine may be one.

Cormac Ó Gráda studies the incidence of cannibalism during famines and focuses on Ireland. Unlike for other great famines elsewhere or before, conclusive evidence for cannibalism and especially murder-cannibalism seems difficult to find for 19th century Ireland. The famine was certainly severe enough for some hearsay about it to emerge, perhaps figuratively. Does the lack of a record imply that the Irish are more humane and principled? Or that the taboo is so strong that cannibalism is unmentionable? While the paper provides an interesting analysis of the historical record, answers to these questions would also be interesting.

Test statistics and the publication game

It is well known that journals do not like replications or confirmations of hypotheses. They are looking for the empirical results that contradict popular wisdom, and this must be influencing the way researchers look for test results. To increase your chances of success, you want to only mention highly significant results and ignore the so-so ones.

Abel Brodeur, Mathias Lé, Marc Sangnier and Yanos Zylberberg look at the distribution of p-values in articles published in the top three economics journals. I am not quite sure what the distribution of p-values would be if the publication process were unbiased, but it would probably look like a Poisson distribution and it would be monotonic on each side of the mode. What the authors find does not look at all like this. There is a distinct lack of test results that just miss the 5% or 10% significance, and distinctively more that just pass those thresholds, making the distribution bimodal. Interestingly, this problem is less present when stars are not used to highlight significance or when the authors are tenured.

These results indicate that there is more than a selection bias. This is an inflation bias by the researcher when he only presents the most significant results, which were obtained by finding the specification that allows to pass the magic significance thresholds. I do not think this is ethical, but the publishing game makes it unavoidable, so the profession is apparently fine with it. I guess we have to tolerate this and take it into account when reading papers much like we know there is grade inflation when looking at transcripts or there is similar inflation when reading recommendation letters.

PS: This paper is a strong candidate for the best paper title of the year. Bravo!

PS2: What is really unethical is claiming results are significant when they are not. The case of Ulrich Lichtenthaler comes to mind, who added "significance stars" to his results when they were not warranted. The fact that he still managed to publish widely is an indictment of the quality of research in business journals, too.

Is kidnap insurance a good thing?

In some countries, kidnapping for ransom has become a common and profitable business. It does not strike as an added-value generating activity, but one has to live with it. One way in which markets have responded to this is that it is now possible to by kidnap insurance that pays ransoms. Is this a good thing? Indeed, kidnapping frequency may increase if there is a higher likelihood that a ransom is going to be paid. That is not unlike US colleges that charge higher tuitions because they can, as public funds for students grants and loans have been ramped up. But let us keep talking about criminal kidnapping.

Alexander Fink and Mark Pingle look into this issued. The first question one may ask is whether this kind on insurance is sustainable in the first place. Indeed, many insurance markets fail due to adverse selection or moral hazard issues. In this case, risk aversion on the insureds is high enough that they are willing to pay premiums sufficiently above what would be actuarially fair. Indeed, there is a risk of getting somebody killed, and optimal kidnappers would want to randomize over this just to make sure that they can extract the most. The presence of insurance will increase the number of kidnapings, but if it does not do this too much, one should see a reduction in killings. We can thus not unambiguously say that kidnap insurance should be allowed.

How much money laundering is there in Italy?

It is well known that the underground economy in Italy is substantial, and that an important share of this is due to illegal activity. Hence, there should be an important amount of money laundering going on, an amount that seems to be impossible to measure given that these activities precisely try not to get detected. But economists can be resourceful and try to pull it off, for example à la Steve Levitt.

Guerino Ardizzi, Carmelo Petraglia, Massimilano Piacenza, Friedrich Schneider and Gilberto Turati try to pull that off, reasoning that money laundering is performed by depositing cash, and that if there are more cash deposits in financial institutions of an Italian province where there is more activity from illegal syndicates, one should be able to back out how much of these deposits are due to money laundering. Concretely, they regress across provinces over four years cash deposits on a few controls, the number of detected extortion crimes and the number of drug dealing, prostitution and possession of stolen goods. One may have some qualms in using detected crimes, which may be a very poor proxy for actual crime, especially for a country that is so corrupt, but I suppose this is all we have. However, this regression assumes that those illegal syndicates stay within the confines of their province when they deposit their proceeds. Given the size of an Italian province (median inhabitants: 375,000), that seems like a real stretch. I guess we still do not know how much money laundering is going on in Italy.

Should managers be liable in court?

It is fair to say people are quite upset that managers are not criminally prosecuted for crimes their businesses do. As the latest case with HSBC shows, where the bank laundered massively money related to circumventing political embargoes and drugs trafficking, was convicted several times and faced only fines that were lower than the profit gained, it seems impossible to adequately punish corporate crime. While lawyers may have some justification for this, let us look at the economics of it.

Andreas Engert and Susanne Goldlücke claims it is difficult to find a case for managers being liable for their mistakes. This comes from the nature of their compensation contract and the reliability of court decisions. When managers take poor decisions, their compensation suffers from it. Thus, one has to be careful not to add too much risk for the manager when the courts add to the ill effects of poor decisions, especially as courts are not perfect either. Part of the argument has to do with the classical principal-agent problem: the performance signal is imperfect, and even if the manager was very careful, luck may be against him, his compensation already suffers, and courts should not pile it on. The nature of the compensation contracts thus matters a lot. With a linear contract, it is never good for the courts to punish the manager. If it non-linear (convex), then it depends on how precisely the courts can work.

Now this all applies to poor decisions, there is not necessarily a crime involved. But as a business is fined for a crime, the compensation of the manager is typically impacted. Is this then sufficient? I am not sure this paper helps completely in this regard. Indeed, crimes are punished with incarceration. The loss of freedom adds another dimension to the punishment which is difficult to reflect in a fine to a business and how this translates in loss of compensation. Someone should look into that.

Machiavellian missionaries

I have had recently the opportunity to chat with a missionary who has been working as a bush doctor in Western Africa. I find it quite admirable that a Westerner is willing to leave easy life aside and spend many years in the middle of an inhospitable nowhere to help others. Of course, the end goal is to spread Christianity, and I have no problem if these free health services are provided through a sponsor.

What I found very disturbing, though, was the approach to converting the locals. Indeed, missionaries tell these pagans that now that they know about God, Jesus and the Bible, they will go to Hell if they do not convert. They would have avoided that fate had they remained ignorant. The missionaries are devout Christians and believe this as well. Can we then really say they care about the locals? They willingly paint the pagans into a corner, threatening them out of nowhere with the worst possible outcome in their afterlife. What is then the point of making terrestrial life a little better? In the end, many locals would much worse off after the arrival of the missionaries.

Complicated auctions are more proftable

There was a time where auction theory limited itself to studying very simple auction, where the subtleties were whether the first or second price should be paid (or the first less an increment). Now, auction theory looks at much more complex mechanisms, for example where bidders may or may not reveal their bids, or whether they are bidding, or where bidding comes with a fix price. Not all these mechanisms try to obtain a surplus maximizing outcome. Some maximize the profits of the seller, sometimes by confusing or even misleading the seller. The most extreme example are penny auctions, about which I posted before (I, II).

Andrea Gallice discusses a variation of the Dutch auction where the current winning bid price remains hidden but can be observed against a fee. This so-called price reveal auction has an additional twist: paying that fee makes the winning bid fall by a predetermined amount. An auction so complex must be designed to maximize someone's surplus. It is the seller. And his profits are even higher if he manages to keep the number of bidders secret. This is not unlike penny auctions, where the profits come from the fees, not the winning bid.

OK, this maximizes profits, but I do not think this maximizes overall well-being. Obfuscation is not likely to be beneficial, and I am quite surprised the author does not address this. Until convinced of the contrary, I am going to assume that such obfuscation is detrimental for society and should be outlawed. And with rules so complex, it would not surprise me that bidders would have a hard time behaving rationally.

Why corruption will always be with us

How would one define corruption. In economic terms, one definition could that two parties engage in a mutually beneficial transaction to the detriment of an other and society in general, and this despite rules put in place to prevent this. I am not sure everyone will agree with this definition, as it includes everyday situations that one may not generally associate with corruption, such as small gifts we offer to superiors or teachers.

Ulrike Malmendier and Klaus Schmidt study, without calling it corruption, such behavior in an experimental setting. They find that subjects of a gift do reciprocate even if they have no incentive to do so. Worse, they reciprocate more if it is at the expense of a third party, and everybody knows that the third party is affected. Finally, participants correctly assess how their behavior was influenced by gifts, but believe others are much more influenced. It is difficult to square any standard theory with these results. It also implies that such gift-giving is going to be difficult to stamp out, at least when it is relatively small such as in these experiments.

Good weather and absenteeism

Ah, the weather is so nice outside, yet I am stuck inside working. If only I could take a vacation day. But wait, I could declare myself sick for a day, would not need a doctor's note because it is just a day, and enjoy life! Well, this is not that easy in my case, as I still need to get the work done, but the temptation is there. And many likely cross that line.

Jingye Shi and Mikal Skuterud use absenteeism data for Canada and find indeed that good weather encourages people to take sick leaves. Given the harsh winter climate in Canada, they limit the analysis to non-winter months and indoor workers, so that the temptations are maximized. Yes, they find that short-term "sickness" increases with good weather, but strangely it affects more workers who do not enjoy sick pay benefits or are on probation. The authors suggest this is because they cannot capture some implicit agreement that one can use short sick leaves for other purposes. That does not convince me.

How to reduce public procurement waste

The biggest waste of public resources probably comes from irregularities in procurement practices. When the bidding process is rigged, or there is none, not only does it cost more, but the job may be not be handed to the best person. The problem is that the checks and balances on procurement processes are costly and it is difficult to get complete enforcement. However, one can threaten with audits and possible punishment, and hope that will induce officials to be more careful. Does this work?

Stefan Litschig and Yves Zamboni discuss an interesting experiment from Brazil. There, local authorities take part in an audit lottery that gives them a 4-6% yearly probability of being drawn for an audit. That does not seem like a high probability of getting caught. However, for a one-time experiment, 120 counties were selected and told that 30 of them would be audited a year later. Did the 20 point increase in the audit probability have an impact? Oh yes, the probability of irregular procurement practices went down by 17-20%. The irregular provision of health services was not affected, either because it is more difficult to measure, or because potential punishment does not include jail. Conclusion: for better government practices, audit more frequently, randomly, and threaten jail.

Corruption and wages of public officials

In some countries, especially in Eastern Europe, corruption in educational institutions is a serious issue, to the point that diplomas do not mean anything. One potential reason for this high level of corruption is that educators and administrators are very poorly paid, and thus are more than willing to accept bribes to let students in, to let them pass exams and graduate. While the practice is well known and even accepted, how prevalent it is is obviously difficult to figure out.

Oana Borcan, Mikael Lindahl and Andreea Mitrut look at an interesting natural experiment in Romania: the wage of all public sector workers, including education, were cut by 25% in May 2010. The cut was unexpected and happened just before exams. They study the Baccalaureate exam, which is the exam at the end of high school, is the entrance ticket to university and is actually rather difficult. Comparing results in public vs. private schools (which where not affected by wage cuts) and 2009 vs. 2010, they find that public schools had suddenly a much higher grades (by one fourth of the standard deviation) and 10-12% more students passed the exams. And this despite the fact that students of all schools were mixed in exam rooms. This could only have happened if the public students knew beforehand what the questions or answers were. And indeed, this exam has the nickname of "Xeroxed exam" in Romania. And who gave them these copies? Well, consumption expenditures of teachers seem to have been unaffected by the wage cuts, according to the Romanian Household Budget Survey...

How effective is a moral appeal in discouraging exam cheating

Several programs have introduced honor codes, especially MBA programs. Students promise not too copy, plagiarize or otherwise cheat, and in response the program administration does not put much in place in terms of surveillance. Simple game theory tells you that if there are few controls, this cannot work. And given that students try to cheat even when they are checked on, imagine what happens when there is no one to watch them. By the way, what influences cheating?

Michał Krawczyk looks at an experiment where students were told cheating was wrong and then took at test. Statistical analysis is then used to figure out who still cheated, which is preferable to notoriously unreliable self-reports. It turns out that a one-time appeal to moral values is not a good deterrent. Also, self-reports of cheating, about the current experiment or in the past, are highly unreliable. Finally, the boys cheat more. No surprise here.